政企合谋与矿难:来自中国省级面板数据的证据

矿难成为中国最大的公共治理难题之一。本文首次利用1995—2005年省级层面的国有重点煤矿死亡事故样本,检验了地方政府和煤矿企业之间的合谋以及其他因素对矿难的影响。特别地,本文主要用三个变量度量政企合谋的程度:主管安全生产的副省长是否本地人、是否在任期的第五年以及任现职时是否超过50岁。结果表明,1995—1997年,当国有重点煤矿由中央政府管理时,政企合谋没有对煤矿死亡率产生显著影响;1998—2002年,当国有重点煤矿下放到省级政府管理时,政企合谋显著地增加了煤矿死亡率;2003—2005年,当负责煤炭安全监察的国家安全生产监督管理总局和国家煤矿安全监察局升级为国务院直属机构,从而与地方政府以及煤炭生产脱钩时,政企合谋的影响变得不显著。本文的结果说明,选择年轻的异地主管官员并且增加其流动性、提高安监机构的独立性对于降低煤矿死亡率具有非常重要的作用。

Coal Mine Accidents and Collusion between Local Governments and Firms:Evidence from Provincial Level Panel Data in China

Coal mine accidents have been the severest problem of public governance in China.Using the panel data of mortality of key state-owned coal mines at provincial level in 1995—2005,for the first time this paper investigates the impact of collusion between local governments and coal-mining firms and other factors on coal-mining accident mortality.Specially,three variables are designed to indicate collusive actions:whether the vice governor who is charge of safety production is native,whether the vice governor is in his fifth tenure,and whether the vice governor is more than 50 years old.It is found that the collusion between local governments and coal-mining firms has no significant effect on coal-mining accident mortality when key state-owned coal mines were under the supervision of central government in 1995—1997 and in 2003—2005;the collusion has significant effect on mortality when key state-owned coal mines were under the supervision of provincial governments in 1998—2002.It is suggested that non-native and mobile officials in charge and independence of the supervision institute of safety production are beneficial to low coal-mining accident mortality.