中央—地方—国有银行—公众博弈:国有独资商业银行改革的基本逻辑

本文在回顾国有银行改革文献的基础上 ,通过多元博弈模型和分析 2 0 0 3年以来中国国有银行在中央—地方—公众—银行博弈中的现实表现 ,得出以下基本结论 :第一 ,鉴于中国产业、地区差别的客观存在 ,政策性信贷需求不可能消亡 ,在缺乏其他转移支付机制的前提下 ,国有银行具有存在的合理性 ;第二 ,中国的国有银行具备五个基本性质 :一是四家银行分化为“政策性”和“商业性”两类 ,由此形成始终被忽视的初始条件 ;二是国有银行是政府和央行的政策传导渠道 ,行政干预成为必然 ;三是低效率是国有银行的天然属性 ;四是国有银行政策性损失与经营性损失具有不可辨别性 ;五是剥离不可能具备一次性特征 ;第三 ,在政策建议上 ,本文认为工农中建应采取不同的改革模式 ,为履行政策性和金融稳定职能 ,工农两行应合并为“中国国民银行” ,保留国有独资 ;而中建两行应单独改制 ,从国有独资到国有控股 ,最后实现市场化商业银行模式。基于以上结论 ,本文提出对改革成本、注资安排和存款保险机制设计等模式的重新思考。

The Logic of State-Owned Commercial Banks' Reform within a Multiplayer Game Framework

This paper analyzes the roles of China's state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) within the multi-game between central and local governments, individuals and SOCBs, through literature review and empirical evidence. Conclusions are as follows: First, given the policy credit demand sourced from industrial and regional difference, a state-owned bank should exist. Second, China's SOCBs show five characteristics, two categories of commercial-based and policy-based SOCBs, government intervention, less-efficiency, non-separation between policy-based loss and mis-operation, and repeated capital injection. Finally, a corner solution is put forward to merge ICBC and ABC into a new China National Bank, while BOC and CCB should be listed, which is a way to influence other policy arrangement, such as deposit insurance and capital injection.