注资与国有银行改革:一个金融政治经济学的视角

本文旨在为人们解读国家通过注资方式推动国有银行改革的意图与绩效提供一个金融政治经济学的视角。其主要命题与观点大致有 :第一 ,政府推动下的银行改革有一个共同的特征 ,那就是一般都受到某种外部因素的刺激并追求短期见效的效果 ;第二 ,在微观经济基础未能得到有效调整的情况下 ,单方面改变银行资本结构的行动注定会无功而返 ;第三 ,国有银行制度在世界范围普遍存在 ,且不乏有效运作的例证 ,通过人为方式降低国有银行比例以提高整体银行效率是一种逻辑误导 ;第四 ,中国国有银行低效率运行的根源不在出资人本身 ,而在于出资人获取回报的特殊经济流程 ;第五 ,若考虑到被巴塞尔协议剔除的一些无形资产可以在国有银行的资本结构中得到确认 ,则国有银行出资人的资本压力就没有人们相象的那么大。本文的结论是 ,中国国有银行的问题是经济改革过程诸多矛盾与利益博弈的长期积淀 ,解决方案须基于演进主义的方法论 ,绝不可毕其功于一役。

Capital Injection and Reform of SOBs: A Perspective of Political Economy of Finance

The arguments put forward in the paper include: 1. Banking reforms under the motivation of governments are usually the result of external stimulus and pursuit of short-term effect. 2. With the micro-level in the economy remaining unchanged, the readjustment of equity structure in our state-owned banks (SOBs) will be doomed to failure. 3. The existence of national banking system on a worldwide basis and its efficient operation indicate that the practice to promote the efficiency of the banking system in China through artificially decreasing the ratio of SOBs is logically misguided. 4. The reason for the low efficiency of SOBs lies with their particular ways to be rewarded rather than with promoters. Therefore the conclusion drawn in the paper is what follows: The problems with our SOBs are actually an eventual reflection of the numerous contradictions and benefit games persistently existing in the reform process and should be dealt with gradually and prudently.