晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因

过去大量的研究强调行政性分权和财政包干下地方官员的财政激励对区域经济发展及其互动的影响。本文建立了一个地方官员政治晋升博弈的简单模型 ,旨在强调地方官员的晋升激励对地区间经济竞争和合作的影响。由于政治晋升博弈的基本特征是一个官员的晋升直接降低另一个官员的晋升机会 ,即一人所得为另一人所失 ,这使得同时处于政治和经济双重竞争的地方官员之间的合作空间非常狭小 ,而竞争空间非常巨大。该模型理解我国区域经济竞争与合作问题提供了一个系统的视角和框架 ,它尤其有助于解释我国长期存在的地方保护主义、“大而全”的地区发展战略和地区间形形色色的产业“大战”和恶性竞争。

The Incentive and Cooperation of Government Officials in the Political Tournaments:An Interpretation of the Prolonged Local Protectionism and Duplicative Investments in China

Previous studies focused on the effects of China's administrative decentralization and fiscal contracting on local economic development and the interactions across regions. This paper builds a simple model of political tournament between local officials and explores the effect of promotion incentives of local officials on the competition and cooperation between regions. Since political tournaments are characterized by the direct conflict of interests between participants, namely one officials' promotion implying its competitor's total failure, local officials under tournaments have little room for cooperation but much room for competition. This simple model contributes to enhancing our understanding of the causes underlying China's prolonged local protectionism, duplicative investments, and excessive industrial competition among regions.