产权安排与企业内部的权力斗争

本文的一个基本假说是 :企业内部的权力斗争与企业的所有权安排有关。我们证明 ,在能力相同情况下 ,企业内部成员占有的股份越大 /经营能力越高 ,每个成员从事生产性活动的积极性越大 ,从事权力斗争的积极性越小 ;内部成员权力斗争的技能越高/控制权收益越大 ,每个成员的生产性努力越小 ,权力投资越大 ;并且 ,权力斗争受随机因素的干扰越小 ,当事人越善于权力斗争 ,控制权收益越大 ,则所有权的效应越显著。在能力不同的情况下 ,为了使能力低的成员不追求控制权 ,必须使他们拥有足够数量的股份 ;并且 ,增加高能力成员的股份也有助于减少低能力成员从事权力斗争的积极性。本文的基本政策含义是 ,解决国有企业的“内耗”问题 ,必须从改革产权制度着手

Property Right Structure and the Struggle for Power with in the Enterprise

The basic hypothesis of this paper is that the struggle for power within the firm is related to ownership strucutre.The underlying premise of the paper is that private control benefits attached to the managerial position induce firm members to contest for power while power seeking efforts hurt productive efforts.Ownership works through balancing control benefits with monetary incentives.This paper shows that increases in the insiders' ownership of the firm can help mitigating the severity of power seeking through dampening the incentive for contestants with low ability to join the struggle for power.This paper sheds some lights on understanding the nature of struggle for power inside the firm in general and inside the SOEs of transitional economies in particular.The policy implications for alleviating internal struggle for power in the context of China are also examined.