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股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护
引用本文:陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001(11).
作者姓名:陈小悦  徐晓东
作者单位:清华大学经济管理学院 100084 (陈小悦),清华大学经济管理学院 100084(徐晓东)
摘    要:公司治理的核心是对投资者利益的保护 ,公司治理、股权结构与企业绩效之间存在非常密切的内在联系。本文对深交所 1 996— 1 999年除金融性行业以外的上市公司股权结构与企业绩效之间的关系所进行的经验研究表明 ,在公司治理对外部投资人利益缺乏保护的情况下 ,流通股比例与企业业绩之间负相关 ;在非保护性行业第一大股东持股比例与企业业绩正相关 ;国有股比例、① 法人股比例与企业业绩之间的相关关系不显著。本文的研究结果表明 ,国有股减持和民营化必须建立在保护投资者利益的基础上 ,否则将不利于公司治理的优化和企业绩效的提高。

关 键 词:公司治理  法律保护  股权结构  企业绩效

Equity Structure,Firm Performance and the Protection for Investers' Interest
Abstract:This study examines the equity structure and the performance of all the listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange excluding financial firms over the span from 1996 to 1999.The empirical evidence suggests that equity structure and corporate governance are closely related to firm performance. By controlling standard economic determinants of return, there is a negative and significant correlation between the proportion of tradable A shares and corporate performance under weak corporate governance in terms of the protection for outside shareholders. Additional analyses indicate that in unprotected industries the firm performance increases with the proportion of the largest shareholder. However, there is little evidence in support of neither a positive correlation between corporate performance and the proportion of legal person shares nor a negative correlation between corporate performance and state owned shares. These findings suggest that the protection for outside shareholders is extremely important in the process of reducing state owned shares and privatization.
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