| 中央政府供给地区生态补偿的内生性缺陷——多数规则下的分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 余璐,李郁芳.中央政府供给地区生态补偿的内生性缺陷——多数规则下的分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2010(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 余璐 李郁芳 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 南方医科大学,人文与管理学院,广东,广州,510515
2. 暨南大学,经济学院,广东,广州,510632 |
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| 摘 要： | 我国现在实施的生态补偿以财政补偿为主,其中中央对地方的财政补偿所占的比例最高.从地方公共品供给的角度看,在多数规则下,中央政府供给地区生态补偿具有内生性缺陷.在政府供给诸如环境保护类型的正溢出性地方公共品方面,中央政府的纵向转移支付有存在的必要,但若占居主导地位则弊大于利.地方政府之间应该加强横向联系,以更多地承担地区生态补偿的责任.
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| 关 键 词： | 生态补偿 中央政府补偿 地方公共品 外部性 最小获胜联盟 |
Endogenous Defects of Central Government Supplying Local Ecological Compensation:An Analysis Under Majority Rule |
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| YU Lu,LI Yufang.Endogenous Defects of Central Government Supplying Local Ecological Compensation:An Analysis Under Majority Rule[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2010(2). |
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| Authors: | YU Lu LI Yufang |
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| Institution: | YU Lu LI Yufang(1.School of Humanities , Management,Southern Medical University,Guangzhou 510515,China,2.School of Economics,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China) |
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| Abstract: | China's ecological compensation is mainly composed of financial compensation,in which the transfer from central government to local government is in the majority,this article explores the endogenous defects when central government supplies local ecological compensation under the majority rule from the perspective of local public goods.The conclusion is that the relation ship among local governments should be strengthened,so as to assume more responsibility for ecological compensation. |
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| Keywords: | Ecological Compensation Central Government Compensation Local Public Goods Externalities The Minimal Connected Winning Coalition |
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