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大股东对上市公司掏空与支持的经济学分析
引用本文:侯晓红.大股东对上市公司掏空与支持的经济学分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2006(5):120-125.
作者姓名:侯晓红
作者单位:中国矿业大学,管理学院,江苏,徐州,221008
摘    要:在公司的所有权安排中,大股东拥有公司的控制权,有能力为获取控制权的私人利益而侵占上市公司的资源。但是,当上市公司陷入经营困境时,大股东可能通过减少自己的侵占行为而使公司具有偿债能力,甚至会用自己的资源进行支持以防止公司破产。如果上市公司的投资回报率低于大股东的预期水平,或者预期上市公司无法继续生存下去时,大股东会以公司外部股东和债权人的利益为代价而对上市公司进行掠夺。

关 键 词:大股东  掏空与支持  产权理论  资产专用性  动态模型
文章编号:1003-5230(2006)05-0120-06
收稿时间:2006-07-21
修稿时间:2006年7月21日

Economic Analysis of Big Shareholders' Tunneling and Propping Their Listed Companies
HOU Xiao-hong.Economic Analysis of Big Shareholders'''' Tunneling and Propping Their Listed Companies[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2006(5):120-125.
Authors:HOU Xiao-hong
Abstract:In the listed companies,the big shareholders can tunnel resources in order to obtain control rights for their private interest because they are privileged to possess control rights in the corporation.However,they can reduce their expropriation,even use their own assets to prop the companies and prevent them from going bankrupt when the listed companies are in operation troubles.They can also expropriate the interest of other shareholders and creditors when the return on investment in their listed companies is lower than expected,or when they expect it is difficult for the listed companies to survive.
Keywords:Big Shareholder  Tunneling and Propping  Property Right Theory  Asset-specific  Dynamic Model
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