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基于技术外溢性的寡头垄断企业研发投资的动态博弈分析
引用本文:张航燕.基于技术外溢性的寡头垄断企业研发投资的动态博弈分析[J].新疆财经学院学报,2008(4):24-26,31.
作者姓名:张航燕
作者单位:首都经济贸易大学,北京,100026 
摘    要:在现代经济社会条件下,企业通过合作研发可以使研发的外部效应内部化,激励企业进行更多的研发活动。同样,合作企业可以共享信息和研究成果,提高研发效率。本文将结合企业研发投资过程中的实际情况,在假定技术不完全独占即存在技术溢出的情况下,通过构建一个两阶段寡头博弈模型对寡头垄断企业R&D进行研究,比较寡头垄断企业在合作研发与非合作研发两种情况下研发投入、产出、社会福利的变化,从中探求合作研究的原因。

关 键 词:技术外溢  寡头垄断  研发  动态博弈

An Dynamic Game Analysis of R&D Investment of Oligopoly Corporate Based on Technology Spillover
ZHANG Hang-yan.An Dynamic Game Analysis of R&D Investment of Oligopoly Corporate Based on Technology Spillover[J].Journal of Xinjiang Finance & Economy Institute,2008(4):24-26,31.
Authors:ZHANG Hang-yan
Institution:ZHANG Hang - yan (Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100026, China)
Abstract:In the modern economic and social conditions, the enterprises through the cooperative R & D may cause the external effect internalized, so that it encourages the enterprise to carry out more R & D investment. Similarly, the cooperative enterprises can share information and research findings to improve tile efficiency of R & D. This paper will combine R & D investment in the process of the actual situation supposing the technology being not completely monopoly. By building a two - stage game model, comparing cooperative R & D with non - cooperative R & D, it analyses the oligopoly corporate R & D and the changes of R & D inputs, outputs, social welfare.
Keywords:technology spillover  oligopoly  R&D  dynamic game
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