排他性与非排他性策略下创新授权契约机制研究

分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在(非)排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。

Study on the Innovation Licensing Contract Mechanism under Exclusive and Non-exclusive Strategy

Under incomplete information, this paper studies the mechanism of licensing contracts where a non-producing innovator sells its quality-improving technology to the producers which compete in Cournot market. The innovator can choose exclusive or non-exclusive licensing strategy. It finds that, in the exclusive licensing, under two-part tariff contract incomplete information makes the innovator give more royalty subsidy to the licensee. However, in the non-exclusive licensing, incomplete weakens the degree of monopoly which is induced by the two-part tariff contract offered by the licensor. Incomplete information makes it possible that the royalty contract can be better than fixed-fee contract under exclusive licensing strategy, which is different with Li and Wang. To improve the social innovation ability, the government should encourage the licenser to choose royalty contract, which can weaken the influence of incomplete information.