高管持股对创新可持续性的影响研究

企业创新活动一旦中断将会产生巨大的调整成本损失。因此，如何保持企业创新可持续性是企业创新研究的重要问题。结合委托代理理论，探索了企业高管持股对创新可持续性的影响，并进一步讨论了高管过度自信与产权性质的调节作用。使用2003-2014年中国A股制造业上市公司面板数据进行实证分析，结果表明：高管持股对企业创新可持续性具有显著正向影响，高管过度自信则弱化了两者间正向关系，而相对于非民营企业，民营企业高管持股对创新可持续性的正向作用更强。同时考虑两种情境效应的综合影响时，在民营企业中高管过度自信的负向调节作用更强。最后，考虑了遗漏变量带来的“选择偏差问题”和内生性问题，采用基于Kernel匹配得分法的反事实检验，为实证结果提供了稳健性证明。

The Research on the Effect of Managerial Ownership on the Persistence of Firm Innovation

The interruption of innovation activities will lead to huge adjustment cost. Thus, how to maintain the continuity of enterprise innovation is an important issue for the research of enterprise innovation. Combining the principal-agent theory, this paper researches the impact of managerial ownership on the persistence of firm innovation, and further discuss the context effects of executive overconfidence and the ownership. Using the panel data of a share companies in manufacturing industry between 2003 and 2014, it finds that managerial ownership can make positive effect on the persistence of firm innovation and executive overconfidence can weaken this positive relationship. Compared to non-private enterprises, the relationship between managerial ownership and the persistence of firm innovation is more significant in the private enterprises. In addition, considering the combined effects of two adjustment variables at the same time, it finds that the context effect of executive overconfidence is stronger in the private enterprises. This paper not only gives suggestions for firms to improve the system of executive management, but also provides references for our governments to formulate policies more directionally.