不完全合同理论视角下渐进性创新的逆向研发外包组织模式、技术溢出与创新能力研究

既有研发外包组织理论主要基于技术优势企业视角，关注如何治理技术溢出等交易成本，忽视了缺少专利和隐性知识的企业进行渐进性创新时最优研发外包组织选择。基于不完全合同视角，从企业对研发中激励代理方努力与降低渐进性创新的不完全替代性成本之间的权衡出发，分析委托方如何合作、并购、委托以及新建研发等组织最优选择。结果表明，当委托方技术水平较低时，最优组织将需要给代理方更多控制权以激励其努力，相反，委托方则保留更多控制权以降低不完全替代性成本。委托方市场规模通过影响代理方的私人收益降低不完全替代性成本，使得委托方愿意放弃控制权以激励代理方努力。新建研发可以看作是委托方通过承担更多时间和风险成本，从而降低不完全替代性成本。在不同组织形式中，委托方对研发投入的积极性是不同的，这决定了委托方通过研发外包获得的技术溢出效应和企业创新能力。

The Organizations of Reverse R&D Outsourcing for Incremental Innovations,Technology Spillover and Innovation Capability

The optimal R&D outsourcing organizations of the firms for incremental innovations without patents and tacit knowledge was seldom analyzed in the literatures which focus on how to mitigate knowledge leakage of the technology-advantaged firms.From the perspective of incomplete contracts,this paper analyzes how a company chooses between cooperation,M&A,delegation,and Greenfield Investment R&D,based on the trade-off between motivating agents to innovate and reducing cost of imperfect substitution of incremental innovations.Firms with higher technology prefer to get more control rights to reduce the cost of imperfect substitutability,and vice versa.The larger market size of the principle reduces the cost of imperfect substitutability,and prefers to reserve more control right to the agent to stifle the latter's incentive.The organization of Greenfield Investment R&D could be a tool for the risk-taking principle to reduce the cost of imperfect substitutability.The principle's innovative efforts,which determine both the technology spillovers in R&D outsourcing and the principle's innovation capability,are different in different organizations of R&D outsourcing.