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组织员工隐性知识共享的博弈分析
引用本文:李志宏,王海燕.组织员工隐性知识共享的博弈分析[J].科技进步与对策,2010,27(6):135-138.
作者姓名:李志宏  王海燕
作者单位:华南理工大学工商管理学院;
摘    要:组织员工隐性知识共享的程度直接反映了组织的知识管理水平,但是在实际的隐性知识共享过程中还存在很多障碍。从现有定性理论研究出发,提取组织员工知识共享的影响变量,给出知识共享过程中员工的效用函数,并利用效用函数建立了动态重复博弈模型。通过模型分析了不同等级知识拥有者在知识共享中的决策方案。根据员工的决策,为组织实现企业内部员工知识共享的良性循环提出对策,以期在知识共享中实现企业和员工的双赢。

关 键 词:隐性知识  知识共享  动态博弈  无限重复博弈  

Dynamic Games Analysis in Tacit Knowledge Sharing Among Organizational Employees
Li Zhihong,Wang Haiyan.Dynamic Games Analysis in Tacit Knowledge Sharing Among Organizational Employees[J].Science & Technology Progress and Policy,2010,27(6):135-138.
Authors:Li Zhihong  Wang Haiyan
Institution:School of Business Administration/a>;South China University of Technology/a>;Guangzhou 510640/a>;China
Abstract:It is important for an organization to improve its core competitive forces by sharing the tacit knowledge among enterprise employees,but there are many obstacles in practice.Based on the existing qualitative investigation,a set of variables are refined for constructing utility function of employee.Using this function,a dynamic game model is built.Based on this model,this paper analyzes the decision process of different levels of knowledge owners in knowledge sharing.At last,some advises are given for the en...
Keywords:Tacit Knowledge  Knowledge Sharing  Dynamic Games  Infinitely Repeated Games  
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