管理层权力制衡强度、债务约束与企业创新投资

企业创新是国家经济可持续增长的关键，受到管理层意愿的影响，因而需要对内部经营者的权力进行制衡。以2010-2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验管理层权力制衡强度对企业创新投资的影响，以及不同债务约束情境下高商业信用配置、高负债水平的调节效应，此外，还考察了产权性质的差异化影响。研究表明，管理层权力制衡强度越大，企业创新投资水平越高；高商业信用强化了该促进作用，而高负债水平弱化了该促进作用。进一步研究发现，管理层权力制衡强度与企业创新投资的关系在民企中更显著；国企能够更好地获得和运用商业信用，使其高商业信用对该关系的强化效应更显著；民企具有更强的债务约束，其高负债水平对该关系的弱化效应更明显。

Management Power Balance Intensity,Debt Constraint and Enterprise Innovative Investment

Enterprise innovation is the key to the sustainable growth of the country’s economy. It is affected by the wishes of the management. Therefore, power balance of internal operators are required. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2018, this paper tests the influence of management power balance intensity to enterprise innovative investment, and the moderating effect of high commercial credit and high debt levels under different debt constraint. In addition, it also examines the differences in property. The evidence confirms that the greater the management power balance intensity, the higher the level of enterprise innovative investment. High commercial credit strengthens this promotion, while high debt levels weaken this promotion. Further researches find that the relationship between management power balance intensity and enterprise innovative investment is more significant in private enterprises. State-owned enterprises can better obtain and use commercial credit, making the strengthening effect of high commercial credit on this relationship more obvious. The stronger debt constraint of private enterprises makes the weakening effect of their high debt level on this relationship more obvious. This conclusion provides a new theoretical perspective and empirical evidence for enterprise innovation.