开放式创新效能提升的制度基础:关系治理还是契约治理

开放式创新是21世纪以来理论研究和管理实践中的热点问题,然而,值得注意的是,在理论研究蓬勃发展的同时,企业实践并未实现预期效果,甚至失败率很高,这一反差不得不引起人们的反思。以往研究忽视了这样一个事实:开放式创新本质上是一种知识联盟,而联盟治理结构是联盟运行的制度基础,不同治理结构会对联盟决策权、利益格局、激励和冲突等问题产生根本影响。整合社会资本理论和交易成本理论,阐释了不同治理结构对开放式创新绩效的影响机理。运用分层线性模型,利用58家制造企业共398份问卷检验了该模型,研究结果表明:1关系治理与开放式创新绩效呈现倒U型关系;2契约治理对开放式创新绩效有倒U型影响;3在网络化程度较低的情境中,关系治理和契约治理能够相互补充,二者共同使用提升了开放式创新绩效。在网络化程度高的情况下,"软"性的关系治理与"硬"性的契约治理具有明显的替代作用,二者共同使用会显著降低开放式创新绩效,形成"软硬兼施"的负效应。

Exploring the Institutional Infrastructure to Enhance the Effectiveness of Open Innovation:Relational or Transactional mechanisms

Open innovation is the theoretical research and management practices in the 21st century hot issue,however,it is worth noting: while the theory booming business practices did not achieve the desired results,and even a high failure rate,the contrast may notIt does not cause people to reflect.Previous studies have ignored the fact that: a knowledge alliance open innovation essence,the Alliance governance structure is operating system-based alliance,decision-making governance structures have different league,the pattern of interests,motivation and conflict have a fundamental problem influences.Building on Transaction Cost and Social Capital theories,this study investigates the different roles transactional and relational mechanisms have in improving open innovation performance.Our study applied to manufacturer supplier dyads in China and used matched survey data (398 samples covered 58firms) to test our hypotheses.Hierarchical multivariate regression suggest that the relational mechanisms has an inverted U shaped impact on the success of open innovation;the transactional mechanisms has an inverted U shaped impact on the open innovation performance as well;the joint effects of the two mechanisms on governing open innovation depends on the integration level of inter-firm network that the focal partners share.Specifically,formal control and trust complement each other only in lower integration level.On the basis of this new perspective,the authors offer theoretical and managerial implications for managing inter-firm governance mechanisms in transitional economies such as China.