| 债务融资、破产与经营者动力 |
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| 引用本文： | 王小卒,朱天.债务融资、破产与经营者动力[J].经济学(季刊),2001(1):143-150. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王小卒 朱天 |
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| 摘 要： | 该文运用一个简单模型分析说明,当股权融资受到限制时,更加严格地执行破产并不一定能解决我国国有企业面临的激励问题,并由此引申出关于我国企业融资与资本市场发展的若干含义.
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| 关 键 词： | 债务融资 破产 激励 |
CAN BANKRUPTCY BE AN EFFECTIVE INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR CHINA'S STATE ENTERPRISES |
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| Wang Xiaozu and Zhu Tian.CAN BANKRUPTCY BE AN EFFECTIVE INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR CHINA'S STATE ENTERPRISES[J].China Economic Quarterly,2001(1):143-150. |
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| Authors: | Wang Xiaozu and Zhu Tian |
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| Abstract: | This paper uses a simple model to show that stricter enforcement of bankruptcy does not necessarily solve the incentive problem faced by China's state enterprises when equity financing is limited. Implications are drawn for the development of corporate finance and capital markets in China. |
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