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Corruption for sales
Institution:1. University of Geneva, Switzerland;2. Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, CEPII and CREST;1. Department of Economics, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1285, United States;2. NBER, United States;3. Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Bd de l''Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France;4. CESifo, Germany;5. Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan 61, avenue du PrŽsident Wilson, Bat Cournot, Office 503, 94235 Cachan Cedex, France
Abstract:This paper investigates the impact of corruption on foreign affiliates’ sales of German multinationals that differ in their level of experience in the foreign market. We exploit the panel dimension of a detailed firm-level dataset to show that more experienced firms are less likely to suffer from the costs related to corruption. Controlling for persistent and unobserved factors at the country and firm levels, we show that corruption reduces unambiguously the sales of new entering firms, while having no impact on the sales of incumbents.
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