审计行业监管有效性研究——基于证监会处罚公告后事务所策略选择的经验证据

随着近年来审计失败案件的频发,政府对审计行业监管的作用越来越受到关注.文章基于证监会行政处罚公告,对受罚事务所与上市公司客户进行配对,研究了处罚公告对受罚事务所与未受罚事务所声誉及审计质量的影响.研究发现,受罚事务所在处罚公告后进行了声誉重塑行为,审计质量得到改善;未受罚事务所在处罚公告后保持原有审计标准,公告前后审计质量无显著变化.而处罚公告后,受罚事务所的审计质量显著高于未受罚事务所,表明证监会的监管改善了行业的审计质量.文章为证监会行政处罚的有效性提供了更多的经验证据,并证实了声誉机制对注册会计师的约束作用;研究结果对证监会、中注协、财政部等监管部门具有借鉴意义,对上市公司与会计师事务所签订审计合约也有非常重要的参考作用.

The Effectiveness of Audit Industry Supervision: Empirical Evidence Based on Firm Strategy Choice after CSRC Administrative Punishment

Compared with the audit markets in China and abroad,the disciplinary risks faced by the firms are different. In China,the Ministry of Finance and China Securities Regulatory Commission (herein-after referred to as CSRC) as the government supervision and administration departments raise the auditors' disciplinary risks. In recent years,CSRC has gradually stepped up the penalties for accounting firms that fail to provide fair audits due to the disclosure of low-quality audit reports;for instance,Shenzhen Pengcheng (the largest accounting firm in South China) was revoked securities business license because of the auditing fail-ure of Green Globe IPO in May 2013. In 2017,Ruihua,the largest accounting firm with Chinese domestic equities,was judged sparing in its efforts to the business of Yatai Industrial Company and its business partners were required not to leave,step out or change the firm by CSRC. Xinyongzhonghe,another famous audit firm in China was punished for 4.4 million RMB for the lack of diligence in the audit of Dengyun Auto-Parts Co. Therefore,under the circumstance that the trend of supervision and punishment of CSRC is intensified,wheth-er audit quality of accounting firms is improving or not is receiving more and more attention in China. In theory,penalties affect the reputation of accounting firms,resulting in reduced audit fees and the risk of loss of customers. However,penalties could be seen as a signal that leads to changes in audit quality includ-ing firms having been punished or not. Their choice could improve the audit quality or do nothing. The exist-ing research only deals with the accounting firms that have been punished;however,the strategies of both pun-ished and unpunished firms about how they react to punishment are worth considering. Therefore,this paper focuses on studying whether accounting firms choose to improve the audit quality or not after being punished by CSRC,and whether those unpunished firms choose to improve the audit quality or not due to the signal of penalty announcement,to probe deeply into the effectiveness of regulatory penalties in the audit industry. Based on the issuance of the Administrative Punishment Announcement of CSRC between 2002 and 2015,the public companies are classified into four types:companies whose punished audit firms are not changed before and after the announcement,companies whose punished audit firms are changed into unpun-ished one after the announcement,companies whose unpunished audit firms are changed into punished one after the announcement,and companies whose audit firms have never been punished. We match the first three types to the last type. This paper provides a detailed analysis of possible strategy choices made by different firms,and empirically shows that the punished firms may have a passive reputation reshaping behavior due to the increasing disciplinary risk after the announcement,thus improving the audit quality. Contrarily,the un-punished firms,whose audit quality has no significant change,are not affected by the punishment announce-ment. The ultimate audit qualities of the punished firms are not less than the unpunished ones,indicating the effective supervision of CSRC in improving the quality of the audit industry. Different from the paired sample studies conducted by previous scholars,this paper further analyzes the audit quality of the industry as a whole after a game analysis of the behavior strategies of the unpunished and the punished. The results bring more empirical evidence for the effectiveness of CSRC's administrative pun-ishment and confirm the restraint effect of the reputation mechanism on the CPA. It also has the policy refer-ence to the regulatory authorities such as CSRC,China AICPA and the Ministry of Finance;moreover,sign-ing an audit contract with an accounting firm also has a very important reference.