教育错配对工资的惩罚效应——来自中国微观面板数据的证据

教育错配如何影响工资?文章基于2010?2014年中国家庭追踪调查面板数据,基于固定效应模型和工具变量估计,测度了教育错配产生的工资惩罚效应及其产生的理论机制.研究表明:过度教育员工每过度一年将承受1.4%的工资惩罚,教育不足员工将获得2.4%的工资红利.工作所需教育水平是40岁以上员工工资的主要决定因素;随着任职生涯的推进,教育错配会得到改善;教育错配与人力资本之间存在补偿机制.文章的政策涵义是:教育主管部门应从市场需求端改革教育体系,提供市场需要的相应技能毕业生.高校应主动顺应社会主义市场经济需求,及时有效地调整学科专业结构和人才培养结构.企业应建立人才识别和多层奖惩机制,充分释放过度教育者的劳动生产率水平.政府应加强就业指导工作,帮助求职者精准定位与其教育水平相匹配的工作,以减少搜寻成本.

The Penalty Effect of Educational Mismatch on Wages: An Empirical Study Based on Micro Panel Data of China

With the expansion of higher education for many years,the difficulty in graduates' employ-ment and the continuous decrease in the starting salaries have become the typical features of China's labor market in recent years. Under pressure from all facets,many university graduates have to engage in jobs that do not match their education. The mismatch between education and jobs not only implies the inefficient alloca-tion of resources invested in education,but also imposes penalty effect on labor wages. How is the effect of educational mismatch on wages? How to avoid measurement error and the heterogeneity from unobservable variable "ability"? What is the theoretical mechanism of the effect of educational mismatch on wages? Thus, this paper analyzes the effect of educational mismatch on wages on the basis of the models proposed by Duncan & Hoffman(1981),and Verdugo,R.R & Verdugo,NT(1989),by using the panel data of China Fam-ily Panel Studies(CFPS)from 2010 to 2014. We use a fixed effects model and instrumental variable estimates to address the two econometric problems faced by the empirical literature:omitted variable bias and measure-ment error. The fixed-effect instrumental variable estimates in this paper confirm that overeducated workers suffer from a wage penalty of 1.4%. Conversely,under-educated employees receive a bonus of 2.4%. Both omitted variable bias and measurement error are inevitable and important factors. The upward bias which is caused by the omission of unobservable variable "ability" is offset by the downward bias caused by measure-ment error to a large extent. In addition,this paper further tests the theoretical mechanism of the effect of edu-cation mismatch on employment. we find educational requirement for jobs is the vital determinant of wages for employees aged 40 or above,while it has no significant effect on wages for those under the age of 40. In other words,as employees' working years are getting longer and longer,their wages gradually depend on their current productivity and skills,rather than the education they have received when they left the education sys-tem. Workers who take voluntary job changes are less prone to over-education. Therefore,as their career pro-gresses,the employees constantly seek jobs that match their educational skills,so that the mismatch has been improved. It means that the occupation liquidity hypothesis holds in China. There is a compensation mechan-ism between education mismatch and human capital. The over-education can compensate for the lack of ex-pression ability,understanding capability,and health at work. The enlightenment contained in the conclusion of this paper is as follows:firstly,the education authorities should reform the education system,so as to provide the skilled graduates needed by the market;secondly,colleges and universities should adjust the sub-ject structure and personnel training structure actively and effectively to meet the needs of the market;what's more,companies should establish the talent identification and multi-level reward and punishment mechanism so as to identify the over-educated workers and release their labor productivity;finally,the governments should strengthen career guidance and help university graduates to find more matched jobs so as to reduce the time of job seeking and weaken the wage premium problem.