代理成本与审计师选择--基于中国IPO公司的研究

西方大量研究表明,公司的代理冲突程度越高,选择大事务所进行审计的动力就越强。文章在对179家IPO公司研究后发现,建立在英美市场经济条件下的代理理论对我国审计师选择行为的解释力并不充分。在公司规模、成长性、财务杠杆、管理层持股比例、董事会独立性等反映公司代理冲突的变量中,仅公司规模与是否选择大事务所进行审计有显著正向关系,管理层持股与是否选择大事务所审计则呈倒U形关系,没有发现成长性、财务杠杆与审计师选择存在显著关系的证据。

Agency Cost and The Choices of Auditors--Evidence from Chinese IPO Firms

A large amount of western research indicates that the desire of management to get bigger auditing firm would increase when the corporate agency conflict became fiercer.The study of 179 Chinese IPO firms in this article,however,shows that the explanation power of the preceding research with the background of U.K.ane U.S.is insufficient.Among all the variables representing corporate agency conflict such as corporate size,growth,leverage,ownership hold by the management,independence of the board etc,it is only the size of firms that has positive relationship with the choice of big auditing firms while the relationship between the ownership hold by the management and the choice of big auditing firms can be expressed with a downside U shape.Meanwhile the author does not find evidence that there is significant relationship between other indicators(growth,leverage,etc.) and the choice of auditors.