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公司异质性、在职消费与机构投资者治理
引用本文:李艳丽,孙剑非,伊志宏.公司异质性、在职消费与机构投资者治理[J].财经研究,2012(6):27-37.
作者姓名:李艳丽  孙剑非  伊志宏
作者单位:北京体育大学管理学院;上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;中国人民大学商学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(70972130)
摘    要:文章实证检验了在代理成本不同的上市公司中,机构投资者持股与管理层在职消费之间的关系。研究发现,机构投资者持股能够有效降低管理层在职消费,而且这种抑制作用在代理成本较高的公司中更加明显;同时,管理层在职消费与公司绩效负相关,这一负相关关系同样在代理成本较高的公司中更加显著。研究结果表明,大力发展机构投资者有利于公司治理的改善,而且在代理成本不同的上市公司中机构投资者的治理作用存在显著差异。

关 键 词:公司异质性  在职消费  机构投资者  公司治理

Corporate Heterogeneity , Perquisites and the Roles of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance
LI Yan-li,SUN Jian-fei,YI Zhi-hong.Corporate Heterogeneity , Perquisites and the Roles of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2012(6):27-37.
Authors:LI Yan-li  SUN Jian-fei  YI Zhi-hong
Institution:1.College of Management,Beijing Sport University,Beijing 100084,China; 2.Antai College of Economics & Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240,China;3.School of Business,Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872,China)
Abstract:This paper empirically tests the relationship between institutional investors and managerial perquisites in listed companies with different agency costs.It shows that the existence of institutional investors can reduce managerial perquisites,especially in companies with high agency costs;managerial perquisites are negatively related to corporate performance,especially in companies with high agency costs.It suggests that the rapid development of institutional investors is beneficial to the improvement of corporate governance,and the roles of institutional investors in corporate governance differ widely in listed companies with different agency costs.
Keywords:corporate heterogeneity  perquisite  institutional investor  corporate governance
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