信息披露、存款保险制度与银行系统性风险

文章基于不完全信息动态博弈模型，对信息披露、存款保险制度与系统性风险之间的作用机制进行了理论分析，并使用2006-2014年24个国家137家上市商业银行的面板数据进行了实证考察。研究发现，提高银行的信息披露程度，有助于降低融资成本和存款保险缴费费率，引导其减小银行间资产的相关性，从而降低系统性风险；存款保险的金融稳定效应不明显，提高信息披露程度有效缓解了存款保险制度的道德风险，两者在降低银行系统性风险方面存在协同效应。设计合理的存款保险制度、经验丰富的监管当局和严格的监管体系有助于发挥市场约束作用，限制存款保险的道德风险，从而维护金融体系的稳定。因此，在我国正式实施存款保险制度的背景下，监管部门应加强银行信息披露和优化存款保险设计，以更好地防范我国金融体系的系统性风险。

Information Disclosure,Deposit Insurance System and Systemic Risks of Banks

Based on an incomplete information dynamic game model,this paper theo-retically analyzes the effects of information disclosure and deposit insurance system on sys-temic risks,and then makes an empirical test by using a panel data of 137 listed commer-cial banks in 24 countries from 2006 to 2014.It arrives at the following conclusions:first-ly,the increase in information disclosure degree in banks helps to reduce financing costs and deposit insurance premiums,leads to the decrease in the correlation between assets of banks,and thereby reduces the systemic risks;secondly,financial stability effects of de-posit insurance are not obvious,and the increase in information disclosure degree effective-ly relieves the moral hazard of deposit insurance system;there is synergistic effect between information disclosure degree and deposit insurance system in the aspect of the reduction in systemic risks.A design of reasonable deposit insurance system,experienced supervision authorities and strict supervision system help to play the restriction role of the market, impose restrictions on the moral hazard of deposit insurance,and thereby maintain the sta-bility of financial system.Therefore,under the background of formal implementation of deposit insurance system,supervision authorities should strengthen information disclosure of banks and optimize the design of deposit insurance to better guard against systemic risks of financial system in China.