金融危机背景下政府干预与银行信贷风险研究

金融危机冲击导致经营环境恶化,银行信贷萎缩,在政府施加的指令性贷款和自身经营利润最大化的双重任务约束下,银行道德风险增加,贷款资金投放背离政府救市意图。文章在一个双重任务约束模型框架下分析了危机中政府干预对国有商业银行贷款风险的影响,根据任务之间的关联度对银行的激励行为做出拓展性解释。动态面板GMM模型实证检验结果显示,政府干预没有造成不良贷款的上升,但对信贷规模的扩张存在明显影响,长期将造成银行资源的过度利用和潜在风险的上升。

Research on Government Intervention and Bank Credit Risk during Financial Crisis

Financial crisis results in the deterioration of operating environment and the contraction of bank credit.Under dual-task constraints of financial support and profit maximization,bank moral hazard raises and the input of loan funds deviates from the intention of government bailout.This paper analyzes the effect of government intervention on credit risk of state-owned commercial banks during financial crisis and provides extended explanation for bank incentives based on the correlation between tasks.The empi...