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国有资本经营预算编制中的博弈关系初探
引用本文:冯瑞菊.国有资本经营预算编制中的博弈关系初探[J].经济经纬,2005(3):130-132.
作者姓名:冯瑞菊
作者单位:河南财经学院,财金系,河南,郑州,450011
摘    要:由于在现代企业产权制度下国有资本所有权与经营权的分离,国资委代表国家作为出资人,在编制国有资本经营预算时,与有独立经营权的企业在预算指标的确定上,因目标不同存在一定的博弈关系,这种博弈关系与其它博弈不同,它是所有权与经营权之间的博弈,是成本与效益的博弈。

关 键 词:国有资本经营预算  博弈  出资人
文章编号:1006-1096(2005)03-0130-03
修稿时间:2005年2月22日

Game Relations in Development of State-Owned Capital Budget
FENG Rui-ju.Game Relations in Development of State-Owned Capital Budget[J].Economic Survey,2005(3):130-132.
Authors:FENG Rui-ju
Abstract:Due to the separation of ownership and power of management in modern enterprises, the representative of the state-owned capital, say, the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission, have different targets with the SOEs in the issue of budget development. Different from other relations, the game relations between the two are crucial and are about cost and benefit.
Keywords:state-owned capital budget  game  representatives of contributors
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