| 业务运营监管策略互动的动态博弈模型分析和政策建议 |
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| 引用本文： | 丁茗.业务运营监管策略互动的动态博弈模型分析和政策建议[J].经济经纬,2006,109(4):21-24. |
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| 作者姓名： | 丁茗 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学,经济管理学院,江苏,南京,210017 |
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| 摘 要： | 对金融企业业务运行的监管是规范金融市场、控制金融风险的一个主要的途径。随着市场化金融监管程度的不断提高,我们有必要研究金融监管机构策略选择和金融企业之间策略选择的相互影响关系,特别是金融企业形成良好的业务运营预期所需要的约束条件。本文试图通过动态博弈模型的建立、分析来研究上述问题,并对金融监管改革时期的策略取向提出建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 收入分配 社会公平 利益集团 既得利益集团 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-1096（2006）04-0021-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-05-10 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年5月10日 |
An Analysis of the Dynamic Game Model for Interactive Business Operation and Inspection Strategy and Policy Suggestions |
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| DING Ming.An Analysis of the Dynamic Game Model for Interactive Business Operation and Inspection Strategy and Policy Suggestions[J].Economic Survey,2006,109(4):21-24. |
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| Authors: | DING Ming |
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| Institution: | School of Economics and Mangement, Hehai University, Nanjing 210098, China |
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| Abstract: | The supervision of the operation of financial enterprises is a major approach to standardize financial market and control financial risks in China.As the degree of financial supervision according to market rules constantly improves,it is necessary to research the interrelation between the strategy choice of finance supervising institutions and that of financial enterprises,especially the restricting conditions for financial enterprises to form favorable operation expectation.The author tries to discuss the above questions by building and analyzing dynamic models and raise some advise on the strategic orientations of the reform in financial supervision. |
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| Keywords: | dynamic game financial supervision honesty and credit behavioral expectation |
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