短缺、拥挤与合谋--以铁路春运车票博弈为例

对短缺物品实行价格上限常常带来拥挤与合谋。当社会规范能够自实施时,可以有效避免拥挤的发生;否则,秩序的维持就要依赖于外部监督的力度。为防止拥挤,一方面要加强社会规范教育,另一方面还要进行有效监督。此外,价格上限的存在使得消费者的支付意愿高于实际支付价格,二者差额形成“租金”,从而成为寻租者追求的目标。为解决合谋问题,应给予寻租商、秩序维持者和资源分配执行者足够的惩罚和激励。

Shortage, Congestion and Collusion: A Ticket Game

Maximum price limitation on those goods in shortage usually goes hand in hand with congestion and collusion. Congestion could be efficiently prohibited when social norm are self-enforceable. Otherwise outside monitoring is inevitable. Still further, the existence of maximum price limitation means that consumers' willingness to pay is much higher than the actual price. The margin in between is rent, which brings about the opportunity of collusion. To solve such rent-seeking behavior, sufficient and severe punishments are both necessary and feasible.