The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames |
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| Authors: | Helmuts Azacis David R Collie |
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| Institution: | aCardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Aberconway Building, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). ‘The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames’, Economics Letters 90, pp. 116–121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative. |
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| Keywords: | Optimal punishments Trigger strategies Collusion Cartels |
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