Persuasion,binary choice,and the costs of dishonesty |
| |
| Authors: | Roland Hodler Simon Loertscher Dominic Rohner |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland;2. Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Australia;3. Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC Lausanne), University of Lausanne, Switzerland |
| |
| Abstract: | We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision. We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert’s preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages. |
| |
| Keywords: | C72 D72 D82 |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
