Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with Nash punishments |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Division of Computing Science & Mathematics, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK;2. School of Computer Science, The University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo 315100, China;3. School of Automation, Huazhong University of Science & Technology, Wuhan 430074, China;4. School of Computer Science, The University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG8 1BB, UK |
| |
| Abstract: | We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria s obtained; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price–quantity supergames. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
