Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves? |
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Authors: | Nikos Nikiforakis |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia |
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Abstract: | A number of experimental studies have shown that the opportunity to punish anti-social behavior increases cooperation levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities cooperators are less willing to punish free riders. As a result, cooperation breaks down and groups have lower earnings in comparison to a treatment without punishments where free riding is predominant. Approximately one quarter of all punishments are retaliated. Counter-punishments appear to be driven partly by strategic considerations and partly by a desire to reciprocate punishments. |
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