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运用委托-代理理论探析林业资金违规问题
引用本文:刘国成,张愈强.运用委托-代理理论探析林业资金违规问题[J].中国林业经济,2006(4):5-9.
作者姓名:刘国成  张愈强
作者单位:1. 东北林业大学,经济管理学院,哈尔滨,150040
2. 中诚信国际信用评级有限责任公司,北京,100031
摘    要:运用委托-代理理论,对林业资金违规问题的产生过程与原因进行了深入分析,指出这一问题不可能被根除,只能在一定程度上得以抑制,激励机制与监督机制的有效设计与完善,是抑制林业资金违规的根本途径,最后,结合我国林业资金监督管理的现状,提出了具体政策建议。

关 键 词:托托-代理  林业  资金  违规
文章编号:1673-5919(2006)04-0005-05
收稿时间:2006-04-17
修稿时间:2006年4月17日

Analyzing the Problem of Using the Forestry Investment against the Compulsory Direction by the Trust-agency Theory
LIU Guo-cheng,ZHANG Yu-qiang.Analyzing the Problem of Using the Forestry Investment against the Compulsory Direction by the Trust-agency Theory[J].China Forestry Economy,2006(4):5-9.
Authors:LIU Guo-cheng  ZHANG Yu-qiang
Abstract:By the theory of trust -agency, deepenly analyzing the course and the reason of using the forest investment against the compulsory direction. Point out the reason that it can not be completely gotten of and only can be controlled to some degree. It is root way by encourage mechanism and control mechanism to control it. At last, raise up the concrete policies according to the present situation of forest investment management of our country.
Keywords:trust - agency  forestry  investment  misuse
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