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工资协商制下企业人力资本投资决策均衡模型
引用本文:荀厚平,徐斌.工资协商制下企业人力资本投资决策均衡模型[J].水利经济,2006,24(1):65-67.
作者姓名:荀厚平  徐斌
作者单位:河海大学商学院,江苏,南京,210098
摘    要:由于人力资本的“天然”属性,企业人力资本投资决策有别于物质资本投资决策,企业人力资本投资主体与投资客体信息不对称,存在委托—代理关系。企业工资制度是影响投资主体和客体进行企业人力资本投资决策的重要因素。基于与市场经济相适应的工资决定和制衡机制———工资协商制度,建立了企业人力资本投资决策的博弈均衡模型,以探讨工资协商制度下的企业人力资本投资均衡策略。

关 键 词:企业人力资本投资  工资制度  决策模型
文章编号:1003-9511(2006)01-0065-03
收稿时间:2005-11-17
修稿时间:2005-11-17

Decision-making model of human capital investment for enterprises under wage negotiation system
XUN Hou-ping,et al.Decision-making model of human capital investment for enterprises under wage negotiation system[J].Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2006,24(1):65-67.
Authors:XUN Hou-ping  
Abstract:Owing to the natural attributes of human capital,decision-making of human capital investment for enterprises is different that of material capital investment.The investment subject and object of human capital is asymmetry,that is,a relationship of principal and agent.The wage system of enterprises is the most important factor for decision-making of human capital investment.Based on the wage negotiation system,a game equilibrium model of desicision-making of human capital investment is established so as to discuss strategies of human capital investment for enterprises.
Keywords:human capital investment for enterprise  wage system  decision-making model
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