| 基于演化博弈的水利工程建设市场主体政府监管模式研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 费凯,王小环,朱晓婧,黄长伟,耿爽.基于演化博弈的水利工程建设市场主体政府监管模式研究[J].水利经济,2019,37(4):56-62. |
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| 作者姓名： | 费凯 王小环 朱晓婧 黄长伟 耿爽 |
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| 作者单位： | 广东省水利厅;河海大学商学院;河海大学项目管理研究所;江苏省"世界水谷"与水生态文明协同创新中心 |
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| 基金项目： | 住房和城乡建设部2018年科学技术项目计划(2018-K8-023)；广东省水利科技计划创新项目(2017-04)；国家社会科学基金(17BGL156)；中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2018B53014,2017B35214) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于水利工程建设市场主体政府监管模式问题,明晰了政府监管部门与水利工程建设市场主体两者的策略选择集合;再针对不同的政府监管模式分别构建了基于博弈双方的复制动态方程;剖析了不同情形下政府监管部门与水利工程建设市场主体两者策略选择的演化路径;最后通过对博弈支付矩阵赋值在不同情形下的策略选择进行仿真,为政府监管部门的战略决策提供理论依据,并有益于水利工程建设市场主体做出科学决策。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府监管 水利工程建设 市场主体 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018/11/14 0:00:00 |
Governmentsupervision modes for market entities of construction of water conservancy projects based on evolutionary game theory |
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| FEI Kai,WANG Xiaohuan,ZHU Xiaojing,HUANG Changwei and GENG Shuang.Governmentsupervision modes for market entities of construction of water conservancy projects based on evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2019,37(4):56-62. |
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| Authors: | FEI Kai WANG Xiaohuan ZHU Xiaojing HUANG Changwei and GENG Shuang |
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| Institution: | Water Resources Department of Guangdong Province, Guangzhou 510635, China,Water Resources Department of Guangdong Province, Guangzhou 510635, China,Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China;Institute of Project Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China;Jiangsu Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center of World Water Valley and Water Ecological Civilization, Nanjing 211100, China,Water Resources Department of Guangdong Province, Guangzhou 510635, China and Water Resources Department of Guangdong Province, Guangzhou 510635, China |
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| Abstract: | The set of strategic choices between the government supervision authorities and the market entities of construction of water conservancy project is first clarified based on the government supervision modes for the market entities of construction of water conservancy projects. Secondly, the replication dynamic equations for different government supervision modes are established based on the two sides of the game. Then the evolution path of the two strategies in different situations is deeply analyzed. Finally, through the evaluation of the game payment matrix, the strategic selection in different situations is simulated, which provides a theoretical basis for the strategic decision of the government supervision departments, and it is beneficial to the scientific decision-making of the market entities of construction of water conservancy projects. |
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| Keywords: | government supervision construction of water conservancy project market entity evolutionary game |
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