Collective Reputation and Quality |
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| Authors: | Jason A Winfree Jill J McCluskey |
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| Institution: | Jason A. Winfree is assistant professor, the Program in Sports Management at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, and Jill J. McCluskey is associate professor, School of Economic Sciences at the Washington State University, Pullman, WA, USA. |
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| Abstract: | Firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality. Collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem. We show that for an experience good without firm traceability, individual firms have the incentive to choose quality levels that are sub-optimal for the group. These results support minimum quality standards. Trigger strategies are analyzed as an alternative solution to this problem. Finally, the implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of Washington apples. |
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| Keywords: | collective reputation specialty products Washington apples |
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