Local interests or centralized targets? How China’s local government implements the farmland policy of Requisition–Compensation Balance |
| |
| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Lanzhou University, China;2. School of Public Administration, Zhejiang University, China;3. School of Tourism and Urban Management, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, China;4. College of Environmental & Resource Sciences, Zhejiang A & F University, China;5. College of Tourism, Hunan Normal University, China;1. Rural Development Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China;2. Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;3. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;4. Key Laboratory of Environment Change and Resources Use in Beibu Gulf, Guangxi Teachers Education University, the Ministry of Education, Nanning 530001, China;1. College of Land Resources and Urban-Rural Planning, Hebei GEO University, No.136, Huaian Road, Yuhua District, Shijiazhuang 050031, China;2. Key Laboratory of Land Surface Pattern and Simulation, Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Science, 11A, Datun Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100101, China;3. Business School, Hebei GEO University, No.136, Huaian Road, Yuhua District, Shijiazhuang 050031, China;1. Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 11A, Datun Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing, 100101, People''s Republic of China;2. Department of Forestry and Natural Resources, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47906, USA;1. College of Resources Science and Technology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China;2. Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China;3. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;1. Department of Land Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, PR China;2. Department of Construction Engineering Management, School of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, Hangzhou, PR China |
| |
| Abstract: | The Requisition–Compensation Balance of Farmland (RCBF) is a strict policy in China aimed at controlling farmland conversion and replenishing farmland loss caused by urban expansion through a set of top-down quotas. These conflict with local interests, since land conversion from agriculture to construction is a key tool by which local governments attract investment and raise fiscal revenue. How should local authorities respond to this centralized policy? This paper presents a framework “quantity–quality–productivity–environment” to investigate local governments’ coping strategy and the holistic performance of the RCBF. The empirical study indicated that local jurisdictions placed economic and financial growth first and continued expropriating farmland on a large-scale, including land of high quality, for development. However, impelled by compulsory quotas and supervision from governments at higher levels, local authorities would partly replenish the quantity loss through farmland exploitation, regardless of the quality of the new cropland and the possible environmental impact. Consequently, fast requisition and unqualified compensation undermined the capacity of regional agricultural output. We suggest that the RCBF is not capable of guaranteeing food security, whilst farmland supplementation threatens the local environment. |
| |
| Keywords: | Requisition–Compensation Balance of Farmland Centralized targets Analytical framework Local government’s response |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
