伊春国有林权改革主体行为与政策的博弈分析

本文在对伊春国有林权改革试点局(所)实地调研的基础上,通过构建博弈模型量化分析了国有林权制度改革利益主体行为与发放林权证政策之间的博弈状况。研究表明,当林改户(林场职工)急需生活资金时,若政府发放林权证则林改户会采取抵押贷款和活立木转让方式筹集资金,若政府不发放林权证则林改户会采取砍伐未成熟林筹集资金;当林改户不缺乏生活资金时,无论政府是否发放林权证,林改户都会采取林木成熟后砍伐以收到最大经济利益。双方博弈结果表明,无论林改户是否急需生活资金,发放林权证都可以使国家和林改户的利益最大化。

Game Analysis of the Subject Behaviors and Policies of State-owned Forestry Property Right Reform in Yichun,Heilongjiang Province

On the basis of a spot research on the Yichun state-owned forestry right reform experiment bureaus (fields),this paper constructs a game model,and makes a quantitative analysis of the game situations between stakeholder behavior of the state-owned forest right system reform and issue policies of the forest property right certification. Research shows that: When the forestry reform households (forestry workers) need life funds urgently,they will apply for mortgage loans and transfer standing trees to raise f...