政府间竞争影响城市土地市场化水平的双边效应研究：基于财政竞争和引资竞争的不同作用

研究目的:本文将政府间竞争划分为财政竞争和引资竞争,比较两者对城市土地市场化水平影响的大小,分析政府间竞争与城市土地市场化水平之间的关系。研究方法:基于2003—2016年全国284个地级市的面板数据,利用双边随机前沿模型测算财政竞争和引资竞争对城市土地市场化水平的影响。研究结果:财政竞争对城市土地市场化水平具有正向效应,提高了城市土地市场化水平1.61%;引资竞争对城市土地市场化水平具有负向效应,降低了城市土地市场化水平12.51%;政府间竞争总体上降低了城市土地市场化水平10.90%。时间趋势表明,政府间竞争对城市土地市场化水平的抑制作用呈现波动下降的状态。研究结论:政府间竞争降低了城市土地市场化水平。

The Bilateral Effect of Intergovernmental Competition on the Level of Urban Land Marketization: Based on the Different Functions of Fiscal Competition and Investment Attraction Competition

The purpose of this paper is to decompose the intergovernmental competition into fiscal competition and investment attraction competition, to compare the bilateral effects, and to analyze the relationship between the intergovernmental competition and the level of urban land marketization. The method is to use the two-tier stochastic frontier model to measure the impact of fiscal competition and investment attraction competition on the level of urban land marketization based on the panel data of 284 prefecture-level cities in China from 2003 to 2016. The results show that: fiscal competition has a positive effect on the level of urban land marketization, increases the level of urban land marketization by 1.61%; investment attraction competition has a negative effect on the level of urban land marketization, reducing the level of urban land marketization by 12.51%; Therefore, the intergovernmental competition generally reduces the level of urban land marketization by 10.90%. Time trend indicates that the inhibition of the level of urban land marketization by intergovernmental competition is in a state of fluctuating decline. In conclusion, intergovernmental competition has reduced the level of urban land marketization.