林农贷款为什么难?——基于动态博弈模型的分析

为解释林农贷款难的原因,构建不完全信息动态博弈模型,对林农借款时与银行的博弈关系进行剖析;构建完全信息动态博弈模型,对林农还款时与银行的博弈关系进行剖析。结果表明:在林业信贷市场中,由于林农贷款期望净收益为正,无论是低风险林农还是高风险林农均愿意向银行申请贷款;但由于林业投资的长周期与高风险性,林农与银行之间存在信息不对称,高风险林农伪装成本低,林农缺乏合适抵押物,林农贷款抵押物处置市场发育滞后,以及政府干预等因素影响,银行给林农贷款的意愿并不强。因此,建议完善政府担保机制、加强林业信用体系、推进森林保险体系建设和培育农村林权流转市场。

Why Is It So Difficult for Forest Farmers to Take Out Loans?——Based on the dynamic game model

In order to explain why forest farmers getting loans is so difficult,this paper,firstly,uses an incomplete information dynamic game model to analyze the game relationship between banks and forest farmers when forest farmers apply for loans; then uses a complete information dynamic game model to analyze for the game relationship between banks and forest farmers when forest farmers repay the loans. At last,this paper get some conclusions,such as: since the expected net return of forest farmers' loans is positive,both the low-risk and high-risk foresters are willing to apply for bank loans;however,there is little willingness of banks to lend money to forest farmers because of such factors as the high risk of forestry investment,the information asymmetry between the foresters and the banks,the low camouflage cost of high-risk foresters,the lack of proper mortgage,the underdeveloped market of mortgage and government intervention. Therefore,some suggestions could be put forward: improving government guarantee systems,reinforcing credit systems of forestry,building insurance systems of forest and developing transference market of forest right.