林业碳汇供给稳定性的演化博弈分析

通过构建演化博弈模型详细地剖析了林业经营者和地方政府博弈系统的演化稳定策略及其演化过程。研究结果表明:林业碳汇项目的前期和后期成本、相关扶持政策的有效性以及扶持成本等因素会影响博弈系统的演化方向,进而影响林业碳汇供给的稳定性。为提高林业碳汇供给的稳定性,地方政府应制定切实有效且精简的林业碳汇扶持政策,林业经营者应有效发挥其自主能动性。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supply Stability of Forestry Carbon Sequestration

⑴ Background——In the report of the 19 th National Congress,President Xi Jinping emphasized that China must implement its emission reduction commitments.Compared with other carbon emission reduction measures,forestry carbon sinks have the advantages of ecological,social and economic benefits.The long-term period of forestry carbon sink projects,large investment in the early stage and other factors have caused the forestry operators' low willingness to supply forestry carbon sinks to a certain extent,which is not conducive to the realization of ecological and social benefits of forestry carbon sinks.⑵ Methods——Evolutionary game theory abandons the hypothesis of "complete rationality" in traditional game theory,and holds that the subject of game is "bounded rationality" because of the limited cognitive ability of individuals.Therefore,evolutionary game theory believes that it is impossible for the game participants to make behavior choices that maximize their own interests through a game,but they can continuously adjust their strategy choices through repeated games,and get the final evolutionary stability strategy.By constructing the dynamic evolutionary game model of local governments and forestry operators,the evolutionary stability strategy and evolution path are analyzed.⑶ Results——Under different conditions,the evolutionary stability strategies of forestry operators and local governments are different.when carbon sink returns are considerable,the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the game system is to provide,not to support.When the cost of supporting forestry carbon sinks is too high and the carbon sink income of forestry operators is low,the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the game system is no supply and no support.When the relevant losses caused by the lag of forestry carbon sink development undertaken by local government institutions are too large and the carbon sink income obtained by forestry carbon sink suppliers are low,the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system is not to provide but to support.When the other losses undertaken by the local government are greater than the support costs,the carbon sink income obtained by the forestry operators under the government support are large,and the carbon sink income obtained without the government support are small,the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system depends on the initial state of the game.The initial state of the game will be affected by the cost of supporting forestry carbon sink development by local government,the operating cost of forestry carbon sink projects,the support efforts,and other factors.⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——The operating costs of forestry carbon sink projects,the effectiveness of support policies,and other factors will affect the evolution direction of the game,and thus affect the stability of the effective supply of forest carbon sinks.Therefore,local governments should effectively reduce the operating cost of forestry carbon sequestration projects through measures such as relevant preferential policies,so as to increase the profitability and financing capacity of relevant forestry operators,and encourage forestry operators to actively provide forestry carbon sinks.Forestry operators should constantly improve their strength in developing forestry carbon sequestration projects,in order to maximize the use of the operational convenience brought about by relevant supporting policies to promote the increase of effective supply of forestry carbon sinks.