森林保险保费补贴政策林业产出激励效应评估

基于开展森林保险保费补贴政策的23个省(市、自治区)2014—2018年面板数据,在分析正向激励效应与负向抑制效应下的森林保险保费补贴政策产出效应传导机制的基础上,运用柯布-道格拉斯生产函数与面板数据模型从林业产出视角分别对全国层面、东部地区和中西部地区的森林保险保费补贴政策实施效果进行评估。结果表明:森林保险保费补贴政策存在产出激励效应,且存在1期滞后;同时,森林保险保费补贴对林业产出的促进效果受影响于林业风险,风险水平的上升会抑制保费补贴政策对林业产出的促进作用;森林保险保费补贴政策产出激励效应及林业风险对补贴政策产出激励效应的影响均存在区域差异性。最后,提出实施保费补贴差异化、逐步提升保障水平等建议。

Evaluation of the Incentive Effect of Forest Insurance Premium Subsidy Policy on Forestry Output

(1)Background——The subsidy policy of forest insurance premium has been implemented for 10 years,but the incentive effect on promoting forestry output has not been analyzed in depth.(2) Methods——Based on the theoretical analysis of the transmission mechanism of the output effect on the forest insurance premium subsidy policy under the positive incentive effect and negative inhibition effect,the panel data of 23 provinces in 2014-2018 are analyzed by using Cobb Douglas production function and the panel data model,to explore the forestry output effect of premium subsidy policy the incentive effect on promoting forestry output of Forest Insurance Premium Subsidy Policy at the national level,eastern region and mid-western region in China. What's more,in order to verify whether the output effect is subject to the forestry risk,the premium subsidy and the forestry risk are included in the model.(3) Results——Firstly,There is output incentive effect in the policy of forest insurance premium subsidy,and there is one period lag,which shows that the forest insurance premium subsidy policy has positive incentive effect on forestry output,and also reflects that the government's forest insurance premium subsidy does not cause welfare dissipation. But the forestry output incentive effect of the forest insurance premium subsidy policy is weak,which may be due to the long-term forestry production cycle. The output incentive of forest insurance premium subsidy policy is a long-term effect,which needs to be gradually increased through the activation of shortterm forest insurance market and the change of production behavior. Secondly,the promotion effect of forest insurance premium subsidies on forestry output depends on the forestry risk,the rise of risk level will inhibit the promotion effect of premium subsidy policy on forestry production. The possible reason is that the current protection level of forest insurance in China is based on the standard of materialized cost or even lower than materialized cost,the enthusiasm of forest farmers to buy forest insurance was inhibited. Thirdly,from the comparison of the effect between the eastern and the mid-western regions,it can be concluded that there are regional differences in the output incentive effect of forest insurance premium subsidy policy and the impact of forestry risk on the output incentive effect,which may be caused by the imbalance of regional development and the difference of forest insurance level.(4) Conclusions and Discussions——The subsidy policy of forest insurance premium has the incentive effect of forest output,and the government's subsidy policy of forest insurance premium does not cause the dissipation of welfare. At the same time,under the current low security level,the role of forest insurance risk protection is limited,which makes the incentive effect of forest insurance premium subsidy policy on forestry output affected by forestry risk. In addition,there are significant differences among the incentive effect of forest insurance premium subsidy policies on forestry output in different regions. Therefore,the following suggestions are put forward: Firstly,the subsidy policy of forest insurance premium should comprehensively consider regional differences and implement differentiated subsidy mechanism. Secondly,the level of forest insurance security should be gradually improved,to ensure that forest farmers could get the protection of recovery and reproduction after suffering. Thirdly,on the basis of scientific determination of insurance premium rate and guarantee level,the scale of subsidy should be calculated scientifically. Fourthly,it is suggested to adjust the linkage mechanism of"reverse subsidy",so as to ensure the timely arrival of subsidy funds for forest insurance premiums in poor areas and improve the willingness of forest farmers in poor areas to participate in the insurance.