乡村森林旅游项目升级发展过程政商博弈探微——基于Z风景区3A创4A的案例分析

以Z风景区3A创4A愿景中当地政府与风景区经营商两个主体的决策行为为研究对象,以制度经济学为理论基础,采用博弈论模型进行分析。结果表明:在政府和经营商目标不一致的前提下,从政府来说,在政绩驱动下急于达到创4A目标,但政府又不能滥用纳税人的钱追加投资,其意愿是让商家继续投资,为创4A发力;从商家来说,虽然创4A有利于项目营利空间,但是客观上有规避未来市场不确定性和投资回报周期长双重风险的意识,还可能由于政府对项目创4A的急切性,导致商家存在"政府有可能追加投资,自己"搭便车"的"等靠要"机会主义思想,追加投资意愿不高;反过来也可能存在政府等待商家投资的搭便车行为。为此,提出以政商共同利益最大化为目标,通过改变激励措施,使政商博弈达到合作状态下较优的均衡结果。

A Probe into the Game between Government and Business in the Upgrading and Development of Rural Forest Tourism Projects: Case Analysis of 3A Creating 4A in Z Scenic Spot

⑴ Background——The government requires to lead the upgrading and development of a specific forest tourism project which is being operated by a business according to the contract In order to meet the needs of government itself's achievement.So the businesses have the possibility of avoiding risks and choosing not to upgrade,or chose speculative choices by hitchhiking by waiting for government's investment to the project's upgrading.But the game relationship between government and business in this case is seldom concerned by academic research.⑵ Methods——Through property rights theory and rent theory in institutional economics,as well as behavioral strategy theory in game theory,we launches the Analysis.This paper explores the game behavior under the government's achievement objectives,which is in the situation of business' "conservative" and possibly opportunistic objectives and the fact that business have acquired "occupancy quasi-rent" of scenic resources due to the existence of contracts.⑶ Conclusions——If the government upgrades the project through public investment for its political achievements,and the business takes the advantages of contract signing to enjoy the returns from the upgrading by hitchhiking or the business and the government do not invest in the project for upgrading,which will lead to the problem of "rent loss" caused by inadequate utilization of resources because the resources can not meet the requirements of the new situation.However,there are still intersections between the goals of the two players.Therefore,the zero-sum game should be transformed into cooperative game and the intersection of the two main objectives should be enlarged.It requires that,on the one hand,the government's performance goal should also be turned into the goal of business to internalize external incentives;on the other hand,the goal of business should be partly turned into the goal of the government,which regards the reasonable risk control and profit of business as its public service goal.In this way,the government and business objectives are consistent.⑷ Suggestion——To make the zero-sum game turned into a cooperative game between the government and the business,it is necessary to expand its intersection.This requires that the government's performance goals be simultaneously turned into the goal of the business.That is,internal incentives are internalized,and a common incentive mechanism is formed in the "community" under the premise that the government and the business target are consistent.Therefore,recommended are that:Firstly,the government should take the lead to change the business additional investment environment and encourage them to invest.Secondly,they can try to increase investment channels and share the risks of business through community participation.Thirdly,giving contracting right of other projects with high profit expectations to the business as risk compensation for upgrading the scenic spots of business investment.Fourthly,the government should take the lead to create a public service platform such as introduce social insurance system to reduce business investment risk.Fifth,the "rent-sharing" model of profit increment between government and business after upgrading of the project can be implemented.Sixth,it is necessary that prolong the process of the construction relating to upgrading of the project to break the business' s "wait for" wish.Seventh,attempts can be made to win the policy-oriented project funding support from the higher government.