Judicial Reform |
| |
| Authors: | Botero Juan Carlos; La Porta Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes Florencio; Shleifer Andrei; Volokh Alexander |
| |
| Institution: | Juan Carlos Botero is with the School of Management at Yale University; his e-mail address is juan.botero{at}yale.edu. Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer, and Alexander Volokh are with the Economics Department at Harvard University; their e-mail addresses are rafael_laporta{at}harvard.edu, ashleifer{at}harvard.edu, and volokh{at}fas.harvard.edu, respectively. Florencio López-de-Silanes is with the School of Management and the Economics Department at Yale University; his e-mail address is florencio.lopezdesilanes{at}yale.edu. |
| |
| Abstract: |
A review of the evidence on judicial reform across countriesshows that those seeking to improve economic performance shouldnot focus on judicial efficiency alone but on independence aswell. It also shows that the level of resources poured intothe judicial system and the accessibility of the system havelittle impact on judicial performance. Most of the problem ofjudicial stagnation stems from inadequate incentives and overlycomplicated procedures. Incentive-oriented reforms that seekto increase accountability, competition, and choice seem tobe the most effective in tackling the problem. But incentivesalone do not correct systematic judicial failure. Chronic judicialstagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing theirflexibility. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 Oxford 等数据库收录！ |
|
