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政策性负担、预算软约束与大型涉农金融机构激励机制设计
引用本文:覃道爱,李兴发,向志容.政策性负担、预算软约束与大型涉农金融机构激励机制设计[J].南方金融,2008(12).
作者姓名:覃道爱  李兴发  向志容
作者单位:中国人民银行海口中心支行,海南,海口,570105
摘    要:本文应用多任务委托代理模型,分析政策性负担下大型涉农金融机构的预算软约束问题。通过求解政府和代理人(经营者)的动态均衡,提出分离政策性业务和商业性业务、明确商业性涉农金融业务不补贴政策、加强监督等措施,可有效激发代理人的努力程度。

关 键 词:农村金融  政策性负担  预算软约束  涉农金融机构  激励机制

Policy Burden, Soft Budget Constraints and the Design of Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Agriculture-related Financial Institutions
Qin Daoai,Li Xingfa,Xiang Zhirong.Policy Burden, Soft Budget Constraints and the Design of Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Agriculture-related Financial Institutions[J].South China Finance,2008(12).
Authors:Qin Daoai  Li Xingfa  Xiang Zhirong
Abstract:This paper applies a Multi-task Principal-Agent model to analyze the soft budget constraint of the large-scale agriculture-related financial institutions which are operating under policy burdens.From achieving the dynamic balance between the government and agents, this paper proposes policy measures such as separation of policy-related business and commercial business, specifying the policy of no subsidy to commercial agriculture-related business, and strengthening supervision etc.All these measures will effectively activate the endeavors of agents.
Keywords:Rural Finance  Policy Burden  Soft Budget Constraint  Agriculture-related Financial Institutions  Incentives
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