存款保险制度诱发道德风险的理论解析

存款保险制度的设计必须考虑到对市场约束、银行稳定性、金融发展和解决金融危机的影响,还要因地制宜地考虑一国的制度和契约环境。在没有解决好信息与监管环境缺陷的条件下,仓促实施显性存款保险制度将会后患无穷。本文对西方近年来的相关研究成果作一管窥,以期有助于中国特色的存款保险制度的审慎设计与适时出台。

Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS) Allures Moral Hazard:An Theoretical Analysis

The design of deposit insurance scheme has to take into consideration not only market discipline,banking stability,financial development and financial crisis treatment,but also a country's specific institutional and contractual environment.It is dangerous to implement such a scheme hastily without addressing properly the deficiencies of information and supervision.In this paper,the author studies the recent western literatures concerned,aimed at providing suggestions on the prudent design and timely inauguration of the DIS with Chinese features.