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Internal pyramid structure,contract enforcement,minority investor protection,and firms’ performance: Evidence from emerging economies
Institution:1. School of Economics & Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, China;2. Institution: School of Accounting, Hangzhou Dianzi University, China;3. Pakistan Air Force-Karachi Institute of Economics & Technology, Pakistan;4. College of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China;5. School of Information Science and Technology, Southwest Jiaotong University, China
Abstract:This study investigates the relationship between internal pyramid structure and performance of Chinese, Pakistani, Malaysian pyramidal firms, the effect of judicial efficiency and minority investor protection on this relationship. The results show that the pyramid structure of Pakistani firms is more complicated than Chinese and Malaysian firms, both vertically and horizontally. The study finds that the impact of control layers on performance is negative and stronger than control chains. Moreover, the results illustrate that the effect of control layers on performance at Chinese firms is negative but lower than at Pakistani and Malaysian firms. However, control chains have insignificant association with performance at Chinese pyramid firms. We find that efficient judiciary abates the negative impact of control layers and chains on performance. Our results reveal that in the absence of efficient courts the minority investors’ protection have insignificant impact on the association between internal pyramid structure and firms’ performance.
Keywords:Internal pyramid structure  Judicial efficiency  Investor protection  Firms’ performance  Emerging economiess
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