Are related-party transactions beneficial or detrimental in emerging markets? New evidence of financial services agreements from China |
| |
Institution: | 1. School of Management, Jinan University, China;2. School of Management, Xiamen University, China;3. School of Accounting, Nanjing University of Finance & Economics, China;1. Alfaisal University, Saudi Arabia;2. University of Leicester, UK;3. University of Lincoln, UK;4. University of Manchester, UK;1. Department of Banking and Financial Management University of Piraeus;2. Aston Business School Aston University, United Kingdom |
| |
Abstract: | This paper examines a new and underexplored form of related-party transactions in which Chinese listed companies sign financial services agreements with affiliated finance companies within the same business group. With FSAs, listed companies can readily finance through internal capital markets. However, some concerns controlling shareholders can use FSAs to embezzle funds of listed companies legitimately, thereby expropriating the wealth of minority shareholders. Using a staggered difference-in-differences model with fixed effects, we empirically examine the economic consequences of FSAs. We document that FSAs are detrimental to listed companies' market valuation and operating performance. This phenomenon mainly concentrates on companies without financial constraints and those with lower bankruptcy risks. Further analysis shows that sound corporate governance could inhibit the signing of FSAs ex-ante. This paper contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of related-party transactions in emerging markets. It also provides empirical support that the internal capital market of business groups in China is inefficient and offers controlling shareholders opportunities for tunneling. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|