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Asset Sales and Secured Creditor Control in Restructuring: A Comparison of the UK,US and Canadian Models
Authors:Alfonso Nocilla
Institution:University College London, London, UKOf the Bar of Ontario. Ph.D. Student (Law)This paper received the 2015 Ian Strang Founders' Award from INSOL International. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the 2015 Canadian Law and Economics Association Conference and INSOL International's 2016 Academics' Colloquium. I am grateful to the organizers and attendees of both conferences, as well as to Riz Mokal, Iris Chiu and Adrian Walters for their comments on earlier drafts.
Abstract:The primary insolvency restructuring mechanism in the UK is administration under the Insolvency Act 1986, as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002. In an administration, an insolvency professional known as an administrator, who is accountable to the insolvent company's creditors as a whole, is appointed to oversee the restructuring. The administration process was designed to rehabilitate distressed but viable companies and businesses and to maximize creditors' recoveries. Increasingly, however, insolvent companies are using this process to sell substantially all of their assets through pre‐packaged administrations or ‘pre‐packs’. In a pre‐pack, the insolvent company and its senior creditors negotiate the terms of the sale prior to initiating administration proceedings and appointing an administrator. The administrator then implements the deal, often with little or no input from junior creditors or other stakeholders. Both the US Bankruptcy Code and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act in Canada permit insolvent companies to sell substantially all of their assets under the auspices of the restructuring legislation. This article compares pre‐packs with these US and Canadian processes, arguing that they are all functionally equivalent in that they facilitate quick realizations for secured creditors by bypassing traditional restructuring processes. This analysis suggests that pre‐packs may give too much control over the restructuring process to secured creditors, encouraging rent‐seeking and other value‐destructive behaviours that undermine the fundamental goals of insolvency law. Copyright © 2017 INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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