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Managing markets for toxic assets
Institution:1. European Central Bank, Sonnemannstraße 20, Frankfurt am Main 60314, Germany;2. Banque de France, rue Croix des Petits Champs 31, Paris 75001, France;3. HEC Paris, rue de la Liberation 1, Jouy en Josas 78350, France;4. CEPR, Great Sutton Street 33, London EC1V 0DX, UK
Abstract:A model in which banks trade toxic assets to raise funds for investment is analyzed. Toxic assets generate an adverse selection problem and, consequently, the interbank asset market provides insufficient liquidity. Investment is inefficiently low because acquiring funding requires banks to sell high-quality assets for less than their “fair” value. Equity injections reduce liquidity and may be counterproductive as a policy for increasing investment. Paradoxically, if it is directed to firms with the greatest liquidity needs, an equity injection will reduce investment further. Asset purchase programs, like the Public–Private Investment Program, often have favorable impacts on liquidity, investment and welfare.
Keywords:Liquidity  Adverse selection  TARP
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