信息不对称、管理者内生偏好与上市公司股权融资偏好

一般以为,上市公司的股权融资偏好是由于不合理的成本因素、有缺陷的监管制度和政策与低效的资本市场等原因造成的.本文分析认为,上市公司股权融资偏好产生的基本原因是管理者的内生融资偏好.如果公司绩效影响管理者的财富(或职位、声誉等),管理者的偏好将支配公司的融资决策;对称信息下,管理者将有充分的股权融资偏好.不对称信息下,如果管理者对公司项目(或资产)拥有私人信息,且厌恶风险,管理者将最大限度地使用股权融资,直至达到均衡.最后,本文提出,管理者对股权融资的偏好是内生的,治理目前上市公司股权融资偏好所产生危害的基本思路是"疏",而不是"堵".

Asymmetric Information, Managerial Preferences and the Stock Financing Preferences of China's Listed Companies

It's generally thought that the reasons of the stock financing preferences of China's listed companies result in the unreasonable cost, the defective institutions and policies, and low sufficient capital market. The paper thought that the basic reason of the stock financing preferences is the endogenetic preference of management. If the company performance affects the managerial wealth (or their position, good reputation. .. etc.), the managerial preferences will dominate the financing decision of company. Under the symmetry information, the management will have the sufficient stock financing preferences. Under the asymmetric information, if the management owns the private information on the company projects( or assets), and risk-averse, the management will use the stock to finance as possible as they can, until to the state of equilibrium. Finally, this paper suggested that the preference of management for stock is endogenetic, and to govern the bad infections of stock financing preferences, should insist on the same principle as "comb", not"block up".