| 中央政府与地方政府在宏观调控领域的博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 左峰.中央政府与地方政府在宏观调控领域的博弈分析[J].中央财政金融学院学报,2007(7):5-9. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 左峰 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 山东大学分校商学院 威海264209 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 中央政府与地方政府在宏观调控领域的博弈已经成为一种客观的经济现象,值得决策部门关注。通过中央政府与地方政府的博弈模型以及地方政府之间博弈的攀比效应可以解释博弈的内在形成机理。博弈既有积极效应,也有消极效应。当前博弈失序之矫正的关键在于加快制度创新,强化监管力度;加强预期研究,打造诚信政府。
|
| 关 键 词： | 中央政府 地方政府 宏观调控博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-1549（2007）07-0005-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-06-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年6月6日 |
Analysis of the Games between Central Authority and Local Authority in the Field of Macroeconomic Control |
| |
| ZUO Feng.Analysis of the Games between Central Authority and Local Authority in the Field of Macroeconomic Control[J].Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics,2007(7):5-9. |
| |
| Authors: | ZUO Feng |
| |
| Abstract: | It has been an objective phenomenon of the games between central authority and local authority in the field of macroeconomic control.Therefore,it deserves careful attention by policy-making body.We could explain the initial game mechanism through game model and the bandwagon effect between them.Nowadays,to rectify the game's disorder lies in fostering institutional innovation,strengthening supervisory capability,enhancing expectation study and making good faith government. |
| |
| Keywords: | Central authority Local authority Macroeconomic control games |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
